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Abstract
This paper, based on empirical research in 2^4 subsidiaries of
American, European, and Japanese Multinational Companies, examines the
trend towards the convergence in organizational practices and decision-
malcing among three types of multinational corporations. The results
show that the global rationalization drive is equally pursued by the
.\merican, German, and Japanese companies. And such practices are
creating a higher level of centralization in decision-making, creating
tension and conflict between the headquarters and subsidiaries and the
'Tui cinational companies and the host countries.

INTERACTION BETOEEN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AOT HOST COUNTRIES:
POWER, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN DECISION-MAKING
Confliccs are not made in heaven. They are basically a creation of
human-beings. They permeate in all societies, wherever interpersonal
and interorganizational interactions are involved. In a sense, they
portray the existence of an age-old basic economic truth of limited
means to achieve limitless ends in the socio-economic life. In this
light, conflicts could be viewed as the basic disagreements between and
among persons and/or institutions concerning the achievements of given
goals and objectives and the application of means to achieve such goals.
Conflicts also signify the existence of imbalances of power leverage
among the interacting parties, persons, or organizations.
To a considerable extent, conflict and power are interrelated and
inseparable phenomena. As Kahn has stated:
"The implication of conf lict . • . to power is inescapable.
To say that A has the power to change B's behavior
necessarily implies that A exerts some force in opposi-
tion to some or all of the previously existing forces
on B. This is conflict; its extent and consequences
depend, of course, on many factors— the nature, basis,
and nagnitude of the force which A exerts and of the
forces which he is attempting to overcome in order to
determine B's behavior" (Kahn, 19b4:l).
."J.C Nation-State Relations in Persoective
Increased attention recently has been focused on the impact of the
r.ui tinational corporations on the national economy, employment, balance
of payments, security, national defense, foreign policy, national
sovereignty, and the social and economic development plans of the host
countries.

This upsurge of concern for the impact of the MNCs can easily be
seen from the numerous inquiries and investigations presently completed
or underway. Such august bodies as the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
(1973), the United Nations (1973, 1978), and many professional associa-
tions, such as the British-North-American Research Association, the
National Industrial Conference Board, and a number of prestigious uni-
versities both here and abroad, have embarked upon issues relative to
the impact of multinational corporations.
The issues raised and intensive dialogues on the subject have
augmented the sensitivity of those outwardly Involved. This has
resulted in an optimistic outlook on the one hand and pessimistic over-
tones on the other hand (Kendall, 1974; Shaker, 1970). Figure 1 shows
the various parties involved in questioning the impact of the MNCs.
The advocators argue that the MNCs are the most powerful engines
of progress ever invented by man; they regard them as "harbinger of a
true world economy" (Ball, 1968).
Critics, on the other hand, accuse the multinationals of exploiting
1 jcal labor, charging high royalty payments tor supplying obsolete or
inappropriate technology, using monopolistic power to eliminate local
entrepreneurs, and of interfering with the national sovereignty of the
developing countries (Turner, 1971; Barnet and Muller , 1974).
In the industrialized countries, except for concern about their
etnical behavior and attacks by organized labor for exporting jobs
(Ruttenberg, 1972), the MNCs are conceived as either a positive force
or a natural element.
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Ilowever, since Che 1973-oll crisis, the potentials and probleras of
the industrialized countries have shifted dramatically. Energy short-
ages and Che ever increasing cost of oil, resulting in double-digit
inflation, uneraploymenc , and overall slowdown of induscrial and econo-
nic acCivlcies have become a cenCral issue in nosC nations around the
world. Ac the sane time, the developing countries, with the help of
the oil-rich Arab countries, have increased their pressures on the
industrialized developed countries to change fundamentally the existing
international 'economic order.
With such fast-changing economic and political realities in the
world, the multinationals, although facing declining sales, profits,
iui intensive competition, have remained silent agents. At the same
tine, to cope with these adverse economic situations, the ilN'Cs ' quest
f.r achieving greater efficiency in their operations has been inten-
5i:ted. Global rationalization of production, financial, research,
'i^'velopraental, and marketing activities have been suggested for
i.i.'i-itMicing the operational efficiency of the multinationals (Vernon,
Although the global-rationalization concept and its accompanying
g ..obai-level organizational structure form have been well articulated
•i:-.(i selectively implemented (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Franko, 1976),
tl'.i' r.'.il attributes or components of this concept, as well as implica-
tions of the process of rationalization, have noc been systematically
explored or even questioned by many researchers. Specifically, answers
to ti»e following questions have not been well explored;
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(1) To what extent does the rationalization process lead to a
higher level of centralization in decision-making at the
headquarters?
(2) What specific decisions are most likely to be centralized?
(3) IVhat are the implications of such centralization in decision-
making on headquarter^subsidiary relationships and on morale
and motivation of the subsidiaries' managers?
(4) What are the Implications of the rationalization process on
the IlNC-nation state's relationships?
The main purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the above
questions.
Research Sources
The paper is based on two large-scale studies on multinational-
nation-state relationships directed by the author during the period
19 74 to 1982. The first study was undertaken with 124 multinational
companies (54 American, 43 European, and 27 Japanese) operating in six
developing countries—Brazil, India, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and
Thailand. The second study was conducted with 120 MNCs (34 American,
45 German, and 41 Japanese) operating in seven industrialized countries--
Australia, Japan, Belgium, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, and
the 'Jnited States.
RESEARCH FOCUS AND CONCEPTUAL SCliEME
Although the study utilized the so-called open-system perspective
pursued in organization and interorganization theory areas, the process
itself is the reverse of the current tliinkiny; (Emery 5< Trlst, 19o9;
Lawrence i. Lorscii, 1969) in these areas. briefly, an cpen-systera
approach highlij;hts the impact of e".ternal environmental factors on the
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Internal attributes of an organization, while in this scudy, atcerapts
were made to explore the impact of internal attributes of an organiza-
tion (MNC) on the external relationships of the focal organization with
the other units of the organization in a given socioeconomic system.
The model postulates that nature and intensity of conflict are a
function of, among other things:
(a) The managerial style (for which U.S., European, and Japanese
ownership of MNCs was substituted as a surrogate);
(b) industries in which MlICs were operating;
(c) size of the MNC's subsidiary (measured in terms of number of
employees, capital investment, perception of the subsidiary's
executive of the relative size of his firm in a given country );
(d) extent of diversification;
(e) relative market power of MNCs;
(f) age or years of the MNC's (subsidiary's) operation in the host
country; and
( g) the expectation differences between MNC and host government
toward each other.
On the host-country side, such attributes as relative political
stibi.ity and extent of diversity among influential political parties
in the country, level of economic and industrial development, and
market and economic conditions, were conceived as important factors
affecting MNC-host-country relationships. To develop a conceptual
model we reviewed and analyze: (a) 119 cases of conflict between MNCs
.ir.d host governments and other publics in the host countries as
reported in academic and popular journals, articles, and books
(;.'eganahi, Fry and Fry, 1974), and ( b) the U.S. State Department study
of i-*3 disputes of American firms operating overseas (U.S. State
Department, 1974). Figure II given in the appendix outlines the ini-
tial conceotual model.
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Dependent Variable (Conflict)
The nature of conflict was classified into four categories: (a)
Value-level conflict; (b) negotiat ional-level conflict; (c) policy-level
conflict; and (d) operational-level conflict. (For operational defini-
tions see Negandhi-Baliga, 1979:17-13).
Categorization in the above manner enabled us to discriminate
between essentially interface and intraorganizational conflict. The
interface construct is used here to denote conflict and interactions
with units in the aggregate and macro environments. The intraorganiza-
tional construct is used to denote conflict and interactions with units
in the task, environment. Thus, value, negotiational contiicts, and
policy conflicts were considered to be interface conflicts, and the
operational conflict to be an intraorganizational conflict .
FU>;CTIONING OF THE MULTINATIONAL COEIPORATIONS"
We will first examine the level of formalization of policies and
pr.ictices, degree of centralization-decentralization, and the relative
influence of the headquarters and the subsidiaries in decision-making.
T'iien we will explore the impact of these factors on the headquarter-
>>uSsldlary relationships. As noted earlier, our aim of examining these
olL-ments was to assess the extent of the global rationalization strate-
-:>"^ litilized by the three types of multinational corporations, namely
the i\merican, the German, and tlie Japanese.
In the next section, we will examine the implications of these
practices on the relationsnips between the .'L'.'Cs and the nation-states.

Level of Foonallzat ion
To assess the level of formalization in the /Xnierican, Ger:aan, and
Japanese niulti national coinpanies, three asoects are examined:
(1) The subsidiaries' dependence on manuals, policies, and
procedures supplied by t'.ie headauarters;
(2) utilization of these policies and procedures for decision-
making; and
(3) the nature and the frequency of the reports required by the
headquarters
.
.\n overwhelmingly large number of the yXmerican subsidiaries (88")
relied on the headquarters' policies. Approximately one-third of the
Ger—.an subsidiaries did the same, while merely 12 percent of the
Jaoanese subsidiaries utilized the policies supplied by their head-
quarters. Conversely, only 6 percent of the t\merican, CS percent of
the German, and 66 percent of the Japanese subsidiaries indicated a
verv iegii;;ible influence on strate;Tic and policy decisions affecting
their operations.
A similar picture emerges when one examines the influence of the
written policies and procedures (whether those supplied by the h.ead-
quarters and/or modified by the subsidiaries) on actual strategic and
policy-level decisions.
')ne can also evaluate the headouarters' relative influences on the
s'i:;sid iaries ' operations by examining the nature and frequency of the
roj. irtj that were required from the subsidiaries' managers.
\lnost all the American subsidiaries, and approximat'?iv two-thirds
of the German arri Japanese subsidiaries studied were required, by
their respective headquarters, to provide up-to-date information on
balince sheet, profit and loss fi'^zures, production output, market
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share, cash and credit posictons, inventory levels, and sales per pro-
duct. The frequency of reporting was (greater for the American (mostly
raonthly) than for the German and Japanese subsidiaries. The only
items with which the subsidiaries were less bothered were the perfor-
raaace reviews of their personnel and the local socio-economic and
political conditions. In other words, the stress is placed more on
those aspects affecting the short-run financial picture of the conpany
rather than on the factors affecting the firm's lonR-term survival and
^rov'th.
The analyses of the above three aspects of the formalization clearly
indicate the increasing levels of formalization that are being introduced
hv f-iie American multinational companies, while the (German MNCs seem to be
cat -hin^ up with the /\merican3. The Japanese companies, however, are
sciii relying on their informal network.
THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OM DECISION'->LAt:iNG
Centralization versus subsidiary-autonomy is a perennial and
c .--r.flict ini situation faced by most multinational companies. Increasing
corn-petition in the '.<rarld market requires some measure of rationalization
or oroduction and marketing processes at a global level, thus requiring
a '..igher degree of centralization of decision-making at the headquarter
nd or regional headquarter levels. On the other hand, to satisfv the
increasing demands from the host as well as the home countries of the
multinationals necessitates some measure of the subsidiary's autonomv
on strategic decision-making.
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To assess the relative influence of the headquarters and sub-
sidiaries in decision-nailing, we exanined the followinj? factors:
Borrowing from local banks
Use of cash flow by the subsidiary
Extension of credit to major customers
Choosing public accountant
Introduction of new product for local market
Servicing of products sold
Use of local advertising agency
Expansion of production capacity
Pricing decisions
Determining aggregate production schedules
Maintenance of production facilities
Appointment of chief executive
Use of expatriate personnel
Layoff of operating personnel
Training programs for local employees
Overall, our results indicate that the subsidiaries seem to have at
least equal influence on decision-making. American suhsiii iaries possess
the least autonomy and Japanese subsidiaries the most. The C-erman sub-
sidiaries are in between those two extremes.
However, the picture of the greater autonomy of the subsidiaries
changes once we compare strategic versus routine decisions (see
Appendix Table 3)
.
To probe further, we computed an overall delegatii:)n index by
assigning different weights to strate^^ic versus routine decisions. The
strategic decisions were wei'-^hted three times hi'^her tfian the routine
decisions. The weighing factor was rhosen to reflect the approximate
ratio of time span of feedback of the stratejiic decisions comoared to
the routine decisions. Table 1 presents the findings for the overall
delegation index and the extent of delegation provided to the
subsidiary's management alone with a set of decisions.
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TABLE 1
e;xtent to which subsidiaries depend on the
WRITTEN POLICIES FROM HE.5lDQU.\RTERS
iMNC-Ownership
Great
Deal
%
To Sone Very Little
Extent to Not at All
6 6
20 48
22 66
American (N^SS)
GerTaan (N=44)
Japanese (N"40)
88
32
12
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As it can be seen from Clie Cable, the overall delegacion indeK is
fairly low in absolute terms. Despite the headquarters' acknowledgement
of a less than perfect understanding of Che subsidiary's operation and
its environment, the subsidiary's influence on strategic decision-making
is minimal.
Relatively speaking, the Japanese subsidiaries seem Co enjoy the
greatest autonomy and the U.S. subsidiaries Che least. German sub-
sidiaries are again in between these two extremes.
Policy and Process Controls
Organizational structure, formalization of policies, reporting
requirements, and the centralized decision-making, wicli respect to Che
strategic business decisions are some of che important means through
which the multinational companies implement clieir unification drive.
To a great extent, such structural devices are simply proforraa tech-
ni>i'ies utilized by an organization to achieve Che desired ends. In
addition, Co imulemenC Che global scracegies, mul tinacional companies
jn.i.TCake corresponding changes in their policies, controls, and coor-
di:>acion of devices concerning:
Ownership of overseas subsidiaries
Sources and means of concrol and coordination
Technological transfer of policies
Incra-company sales and purchases
Strategic and long-range planning
Manpower and staffing policies
In other words, it is tlirough chese processes chaC c'ne global struc-
ture and scracegies are being implemenCed.

-12-
Ovmershlp Policies
Although the ownership of foreign subsidiaries and controlling of
these subsidiaries are conceptually two different aspects, the inter-
'elationships among them are very close and at times undistinguishable.
As the firm expands its international business activities and accumu-
lates certain expertise in conducting international business, a desire
to integrate and unify its overseas units into a global system increases,
To accomplish these objectives, besides restructuring the organization,
the firm will move to increase its ownership share in the overseas sub-
sidiaries.
Ln other words, as Stopford and Wells have found, in their study of
187 U.S. NNCs , "In most cases in which firms showed strong preference
for wholly-owned subsidiaries, the issue of control appeared to be
paramount" (1972:107). They go on to state that "certain strategies
demanded tight central controls: others did not. ...Strategies that
are generally extracted through a tightly controlled organization are
also usually associated with a strong preference for wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries" (1972:107). Overall, they found that the firms emphasizing
marketing and advertising techniques, rationalization of production
proresses, and control over sources of raw materials tend to prefer
wholly-owned subsiaiarles.
This trend seems quite visible with respect to the /American multi-
national companies. For example, the study undertaken in 1971 by Booz,
Allen and Hamilton, a consulting firm, observed that appro:<lmately 60
percent of the new overseas subsidiaries established by the U.S. M!JCs
were wholly owned, another 8 to 9 percent were majority owned, and in
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only 7 to 8 percent, the U.S. parent companies had minor equity
interests (1971:9). In spite of increasing demands by the host
countries, especially the developing nations, this trend of increased
equity holding in overseas subsidiaries continues. As we will see
below, even the European and Japanese multinational companies, which
were more inclined to enter into joint ventures, now seem to prefer
either wholly-owned or majority-owned subsidiaries.
Data collected in the mid-1960s by the Harvard Multinational
Project Group indicates that some 63 percent of the subsidiaries of the
large 187 U.S. multinational companies were wholly owned by the parent
companies, an additional 14 percent of the parent companies had majority
equity, and in only less than one-fourth of the subsidiaries, the U.S.
.".;.Cs had minority interests (Stopford-Wells , 1972:100). It is also
irceresting to note that there were no appreciable differences with
respect to the levels of equity holdings by U.S. parent companies in
o.orseas subsidiaries located in industrialized versus developing coun-
tries.
This trend of maintaining overall control on subsidiaries through
the direct ownership has changed very little during 1966 to 1975. For
exainple, of the total of 11,198 U.S. subsidiaries operating in foreign
CMintries (as of Jan. 1976), some 7,741 (69 percent) were wholly owned,
1". additional 10 percent were majority owned, and only 10 percent of
the U.S. parent companies were holding minority interest (Curhan et al,
1977:21).
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Our Results
Although our study attempted to secure equal numbers of the wholly-
owned and jointly-owned subsidiaries of American, German, and Japanese
multinational companies, we were not able to find the required number
of Joint-venture subsidiaries in the various countries. Thus, of the
120 subsidiaries studied in the seven countries (Mexico, W. Germany,
U.K., France, Spain, Portugal, and the U.S.), about 107 of thera (89
percent) were wholly owned, while only 3 percent were minority owned.
There were some minor differences among the three types of the multi-
national companies studied, namely, the Japanese companies still pre-
ferred joint ownership of their subsidiaries as compared to the American
and German multinationals; but this preference, as discussed above, was
on a decline.
To summarize, our own results as well as those reported by other
researchers, clearly indicate the multinationals' preference for main-
taining control through the ownership. And the drive for Che unifica-
tion and global rationalization is pushing even the German and Japanese
multinational companies to acquire larger equity in their overseas sub-
sidiaries. However, while carrying out the global rationalization
plans, the headquarters 'nave, by and large, remained ambivalent about
their policies with respect to ownership. Our inquiry indicates that
only one-fourth of the companies have had a specific policy of acquiring
100 percent ownership in their subsidiaries, the rest claimed a pre-
ference for joint ventures or were guided by t!ie specific circumstances
and demands made by the host countries.
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(a) The level of sophisticated technology utilized by the
subsidiaries
(b) Relative technology of the subsidiaries as compared to
what was utilized by other firms in respective countries
(c) The extent of technological transfers from the head-
quarters to the subsidiaries, and from the subsidiaries
to the headquarters
(d) Research and development activities undertaken by the
subsidiaries.
Collectively, the results on these four aspects of technoloi^y
clearly indicate a heavy reliance on the part of the overseas sub-
sidiaries on their respective headquarters. The subsidiaries are not
only initially borrowing technologv from their headquarters, but thev
are also depending on then for new technological Icnow-how from their
research and developmental laboratories. In other words, very little
R and D activities are being carried out at the subsidiaries' levels.
Sone 60, 80, and 78 percent of the American, German, and Japanese sub-
sidiaries, respectively, did not spend significant amounts of money on
this account. Among the three types of M>JCs , a greater number of
.Ar.erican MNCs have begun to decentralize their R and D activities
(sine 40 percent of the U.S. subsidiaries claimed to spend between 1
to 10 million U.S. dollars on such activities, as compared to 11 and
2 3 oercent by the German and Japanese subsidiaries). \Iheii one con-
siders the fact that the majority of the subsidiaries studied, were
located in the highly industrialized countries, such as the United
States, West Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Japan, this >unount
of expenditures on R and D does not look very impressive. Vorv few
subsidiaries have matured enough to transfer technological know-how to
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their headquarters. Here also, Che American MNCs are Che forerunners.
Some 41 percenc of cheir overseas subsidiaries are involved in Che
reverse flow of the technology. However, at the same Cirae,
overwhelmingly larger proportions of their subsidiaries (88 percent)
secure their technologies from the headquarters.
As the mul tinationality of Che firm increases, Che technological
transfer is likely to be stabilized and Che reverse flow of Ceciinology
nay increase. Our results thus far show that the exports from the
headquarters outnumbered the imports of technology by Che headquarters
from their own subsidiaries, indicating a considerable degree of depen-
dency on the part of the subsidiaries on their home offices.
In cr,3-Comoanv Purchases and Sales
Besides creating a technological dependency, the global rationaliza-
tion drive by the MNCs may induce the firns to internalize their trans-
actions both to minimize the competitive pressures and to achieve
efrective coordination of the global units of operations.
As Buckley and Casson's study indicates, the nuitinational firms
attempt to grow by eliminating external oiarkets of inCermediace goods
through internalizing those mar!:ets within the firm. They also found
that the incentives to internalize the markets are strongest among the
r ir~.s with high technology and research and developmental intensity
(1976;.
It has also been shown that the .American multinational firms seem
to have greater tendency to internalize their markets.
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The United Nations' statistics show that some 23 percent of sales
of the /\iiierican affiliates were Intra-company transactions (1978).
Such intra-company dealings are higher in mining and petroleum
industries than in the manufacturing sector, and area-wise, they are
more significant for the affiliates located in developing countries
than for those in the developed countries. On the other hand, European
and Japanese multinational firms are known to be utilizing local Inputs
in greater proportions, both to satisfy the host governmental demands
as well as to grant higher degrees of autonomy to their overseas sub-
sidiaries. This is especially true for developing countries where such
demands are most intensive.
Our results show a great deal of convergence in sourcing policies
and practices of the three types of the multinational companies.
Approximately two-thirds of the American, German, and Japanese sub-
sidiaries purchased more than one-quarter of their requirements of raw
materials, semi-finished, and finished goods from their respective
parent organizations. However, at the same time, except for the
.\merican subsidiaries, very negligible trade exists among the sub-
sidiaries and other affiliates of the parent company located in
different countries.
/v.-lronmental Scanning and Strategic Long-Range Planning
Environmental scanning and strategic long-range planning are
perhaps the most important integrating devices available to the multi-
national firms tD achieve their global strategies. These f«D functions
are conceived as the top-level executives' responsibilities and are
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concerned with the development of tundamental goals and major policies,
assessment of the corporate strengths and weaknesses as well as the
external environments and the deployment of corporate resources to meet
the stated objectives. If these goals and objectives are well articu-
lated within the restraints of the environmental conditions and cor-
porate resources, they in turn, become powerful tools of control and
coordination of the global units. Our inquiry on this aspect was
mainly directed toward examining the use of strategic planning and
environmental scanning as a control device. To explore this aspect,
we collected the following data from the M>JCs ' neadquarters and their
subsidiaries:
• Nature of environmental scanning undertaken by the head-
quarters and subsidiaries.
• Use made of the environmental scanning data.
• Role of the subsidiaries in generating information.
• Information feed-back system.
• Nature of long-range planning undertaken by the headquarters
and subsidiaries.
• Involvement of the subsidiaries in long-range planning
processes.
Our results show that the U.S. MMCs are the most active among the
three types of JCJCs ' systems studied in utilizing the planning processes
as integrating and controlling devices as discussed above. The majority
of the U.S. companies not only undertakes Long-range, strategic planning
but also involves in scanning the environments in a systematic manner,
although the factors examined in the environmental scanning are iMiniy
related to the general economic environments ^nd iTiarket conditions.
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Many of Chese companies also ciain a systematic use of environmental
forecasting in their planning processes.
However, both the planning and the environmental scanning functions
are, to a large extent, headquarter-oriented . More specifically,
approximately one-third of the subsidiaries of American, German, and
Japanese multinational companies undertake some sort of environmental
scanning, while some 46, 33, and 18 percent of these subsidiaries,
respectively, are involved in long-range planning. The centralization
of these two functions is more clearly seen with respect to the com-
nunication patterns concerning the planning and environmental scanning
processes between the subsidiaries and the respective headquarters.
.Anon'j the American JINCs , the nature of communication concerning these
two aspects is highly formalized , while the German and Japanese com-
panies seem to be moving rapidly by following the .'\merican example.
Moreover, these communications are transacted through instructions and
i^oeratives rather than constructive exchanges of ideas and information.
Approximately :)ne-third of the subsidiaries surveyed felt that their
vie-wpoints were utilized by the headquarters in formulatinjj long-range
-^oals and objectives.
To sum up, all the three t;fpes of IttJCs are utilizing strategic
l')ng-range planning and environmental scannin?^ as an inro'/rating device
to control and coordinate their global spanning activities. Moreover,
these functions are largely headquarter-oriented, and the overseas sub-
sidiaries seem to play a very mar-^inai role in ;^oals and target-settings
even for their own individual operations.

There has been a considerable move on Che pare of Che raultlnacionai
companies to localize Cheir foreign subsidiaries' operations and place
local nationals in Cop positions. For example, in an earlier study-
undertaken by Che senior author, which was referred above (Negandhi)
,
there were no nore than a dozen or so American nationals in 56 sub-
sidiaries surveyed in Che six developing countries. Also, in the
1974-76 study of 124 U.S., European, and Japanese mulCinatliMial com-
panies in developing councrles (Negandhi-Ballga) , we observed the con-
tinuation of this trend among Che American MMCs . The majority of the
I p-level executive positions in the U.S. subsidiaries were filled with
locil nationals. In contrast, the majority of Che Japanese MNCs (79%)
did not employ even a single host-country national In the top-level
management ranks. The German ''CJCs have localized their overseas opera-
tt yns more than the Japanese and less than the <Vmerlcans.
The drive for global rationalization by the MfJCs in Industrialized
countries seems to be changing Che above pattern of localization.
Our inquiry concerning the manpower policies and practices for
staffing of Che subsidiaries' cop posiclons, Che number of foreign
nationals represented in the corporate board, and the holding of top-
level executive positions in the headquarters, all points toward an tn-
crrtasiag trend of establishing controls through key personnel from the
hone offices. An overwhelming proportion of the three MNCs studied
filled Che key positions of their ovi^rseas subsidiaries through expatri-
ates, although policy-wise, they were largely ambivalent In pursuing
such policies. In the same vein, there were few foreign personnel
r3presencad in the corporate board and/or top management echelons at
the headquarters.
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Other researchers also have reported such trends in the multi-
nationals' manpower policies and practices. For exanple, Galbraith and
Edstrom (1976:289-310), in their study of four large European multi-
national companies, found that the managerial transfers from the home
offices to the overseas subsidiaries were, to a large extent, motivated
to control and coordinate the global strategies of these firms.
Simmonds (1966:115-22) had indicated such ethnocentric trends among the
U.S. multinationals as early as 1965.
IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION ON
HEADQUARTER-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS
We realize that the inter-unit relationships are not always smooth
and conflict-free in any organization. Besides the communication
problems, there are perceptual, motivational, and cognitive differences
among the persons working in different units of a given organization.
And conflicts arising due to these differences are not necessarily dys-
functional. In fact, as the studies of Barker, Dembo and Levin (1941),
Goldstein (1951), Allport (1953:107-10 9) and Rogers (1959:184-256), to
name a few, indicate a certain amount of tension and frustration
actually increases creativity, satisfaction, performance, and effec-
tiveness of the individuals concerned. However, as Caplow (1953:3) has
argued, the spontaneous and unregulated conflict is a direct threat to
t.ie crganizatlonal growth and existence. What is discussed below are
the actual cases of dee;r-seated conflicts and frustrations as reported
by the managers of the overseas subsidiaries which were seriously
affecting their abilities to effectively raanage their units of opera-
t tons
.
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Crltlcal Problems In Developing Countries
Our earlier studies (Negandhl-Ballga) , conducted in the six deve-
loping countries, indicate a high intensity of conflict between the
headquarters and subsidiaries of the American ICJCs. Particularly, the
subsidiaries' managers complained a great deal about their inabilities
to meet the environmental demands of the host countries due to the
centralized decision-making at the headquarters' level. A large
majority of the executives interviewed in American subsidiaries (n = 54)
felt that they were little more than "peons" in terras of their head-
office hierarchy, and that communication between them and the head-
quarters' personnel was strictly orders and imperatives from the home
oft ices.
In contrast to such apparent tensions Jnd misgivings between the
L'.S. subsidiaries' managers and their head-offices, the European and
the Japanese managers felt rather comfortable in their relationship
with their head-offices. Although there was relatively much less for-
mal reporting to be found in the European and Japanese ;-CICs , the over-
seas managers felt that they were involved in and informed about the
major strategic decisions undertaken back home, and their own voices
and viewpoints were seriously considered during the formulation of
major policies affecting their operations. They also felt tliat they
'ijj considerable latitude in running their operations. In this respect,
most of the American expatriate managers we interviewed f..'it that their
roles and duties were narrowly defined; they were simply just another
cog in the corporate machine.

Critical Problems In Industrialized Countries
In the industrialized countries, the scene of greater satisfaction
on the part of the European and Japanese subsidiaries' managers has
changed considerably. The global unification plans pursued by all the
three types of MNCs—American, German, and Japanese—in these countries
have brought about similar problems in their relationship with the
respective headquarters.
As shown in Table 2, the capital investment and market- and product-
related issues dominated the scene in all three types of multinational
companies. More than one-third of the critical problems existing
between the headquarters and the subsidiaries were related to these two
aspects. Overall, the Japanese subsidiaries were less concerned about
their decision-making authorities, while both for American and German
subsidiaries this was a critical problem by itself. Who has the right
and the power to make decisions concerning subsidiary-operations, was a
highly debated and unsettled issue in the latter subsidiaries. On the
other hand, the issues related to the personnel problems were more pre-
valent in the Japanese subsidiaries.
Although all the three types of ^IflCs have been utilizing home-
country nationals to staff the key exectitive positions in their over-
seas subsidiary-operations, Japanese MTICs seemed to rely more heavily
on expatriates to run their subsidiaries. The same was true ia the
developing countries, where they were more inclined to even fill the
middle-management and technical-level positions in their overseas sub-
sidiaries with expatriates. Such ethnocentric practices iiave resulted
in serious tensions and conflicts, not only between expatriates and
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TABLE 9
NATURE OF CRITICAL ISSUES BETWEEN
HEADQUARTERS AliD SUBSIDIARIES OF ;\MERICAN,
GERllAN, AND JAPATJESE MULTINATIONALS
Nationa lity of Multinationals
NATURE OF CRITICAL
ISSUES AIID PROBLEMS American German Japanese Total
Nature of Critical
Issues Concerning:
(N=12)
%
(N=20) (N=16) (N=48)
Capital Investment 25 25 18 23
Marketing and Sales-
Related Issues 17 15 25 19
Personnel Problems 8 10 25 15
."'.eeting Home and Host
Countries' Demands 8 10 19 12
Issues Concerning
Decision-Making
Authorities 42 AO 13 31
Total Percentage 100 100 100 100
.-:rjoccurring of Critical
ProDiens Between
H'j.iviquarters and
Sa:?s idiaries
(N=8) (N=i2) (N=b) (N-25)
rlr.ancial Matters 50 50 33 45
Production and Product-
Helated Matters 50 33 17 33
Personnel-Related
Issues ~ 17 50 22
1
Toc.il ?-jrcenCJce 1(1.
J
I'j ) LUiJ i!j(J
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Local nationals in subsidiaries, but also between expatriate subsidiary
personnel and the home-office executives. In othor words, the exces-
sive use of the personal mode of control which the Japanese companies
traditionally have used to utilize the so-called "rinf^i" or "bottora-up"
system of decision-making, has become a more serious bottleneck in
managing the subsidiary-operations in West European countries and
Australia. On the other hand, in the United States, Japanese sub-
sidiaries seem to be receiving hi^h marks on their tnanat^ement practices
due to the current productivity problems encountered by the U.S. com-
panies (Ouchi, 1981). Conseauently , the myopic fad of utilizing
Japanese practices to boost the American competitive position in the
domestic and world markets seems to ignore the problems the Japanese
companies themselves are facing. Yoshino, for example, underscored
tie practical limitations of such decision-making systems several
ye irs ago. He stated:
"Japanese have extended the Ringi system of
decision-making to international operations with
virtually no alterations. ..( However) the extension
of the Ringi system... has several immediate as well
as long-range implications. .. First ... it has created
some practical difficulties for the management of
foreign subsidiaries, because it is they who must,
somehou, bridge Che gap that is created by their
physical operation and isolation from the parent
company. This diverts their attention from the
pressing needs of management of the local enter-
prise and is often a great source of frustration
for them. Furthermore, the decision process can
be extremely time-consuming when circumstances
require rapid responses. ..( The] long-terra implica-
tions of extending the Rlntri system... are that it
makes the participation of non-Japanese nationals
in the decision-making process extremely difficult"
(Yoshino:163) .
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Ir.censity of Critical Issues
To a large extent, the problems outlined above are not unique for
Che ciulcinational companies. Any diversified large company with divi-
sional product responsibilities may face similar capital investment,
Tiarket and product related and personnel issues. However, domestically
oriented firms nay be able to cope with these issues more easily than
the multinational companies due to relatively homogeneous environmental
t-onditions under which they are operating. The multinational company,
by its very nature, has to respond to the varied environmental and socio-
cultural conditions. And by so doing, the issues may indeed stifle its
efficiency, drain the executives' energies, and even threaten its
growth and survival.
To probe into the seriousness of such critical issues, we inquired
about the climate of interactions between the headquarters' and the
SLibsidiaries ' personnel, level of executive personnel involved, and the
tii:ie and cost of resolving the issues. We also attempted to assess the
ov.^rail impact of such critical issues on the executive's morale and
I'.i^ motivation.
Our results indicate the seriousness of these critical problems
existing between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. The climate of
t IL-T.jct ions was most tense in tlie U.S. MNCs , and the least tense in
.J.ipanese !-C<'Cs . German IIi.'Cs were in-between these two extremes. In all
the three types of >CiCs , the top-level executives were directly involved
in these issues, and the large majority of the cases were not resolved
in less than six months. These issues were generally brouelit up by the
suosidiaries ' personnel, and they were resolved i.n formal meetings
called by the headquarters.

Besides Che differences in che incerpersonal-interaccion cliniaco,
Che /Xmerican, German, and Japanese MNCs differ In Che relacive
influences of headquarters versus subsidiaries in resolving the issues.
The Gernan and Japanese MNCs' subsudiaries have greater influence in
resolving Che issues Chan Cheir counterparC Americans.
Notwithstanding such differences in American, German, and Japanese
approaches, the critical issues arising due to Che impleraencacion of
che global unification plans do drain off the executives' energies in
ail three types of MNCs. Moreover, such issues adversely affected the
Taorale and motivation of the subsidiaries' managers.
MNCs-NATlON-STATES' KJELATLONSHIPS
Conrlicts and Conflicting Issues in Developing Countries
From time Co Cime cercain conflicts between MNCs and host govern-
mencs erupc in a spectacular manner, in the form of nacionalizacion and
e:<propriacion of propercy. However, as Fayerweather (196b) has remarked,
"'lore common and actually of greater overall importance are a multitude
->: lesser points of conf lict . . . (such as) the share of capital and
cur.crol a foreign company may hold in a local' venture , Che degree of
r-> •ulaclon foreign governmenCs exercise over foreign operaCions, and
•^any ocher facecs of overseas business."
rimilarly, Mikesell (1971) has idencified Che following factors
iiaving the potential of causing conflict between MNCs and host govern-
ments, particularly with respecc co Che mineral and peCroleum indusCries:
1. Division of total net revenues iron i^perations between the foreign
countrv and the host L^overnment.
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2. The control of export prices, output, and the other conditions
affecting the level of total revenues.
3. The domestic impact of foreign-companv operations.
U. The percentage of foreign o\^mership.
Bergsten (1974) has suggested that the differences between the
domestic socio-economic objectives of the host government, and the
objectives of the foreign investor, give rise to conflicts between
these two parties. In more specific terms, he identifies the following
sues over which conflicts and tensions are bound to arise:
Job-quota requirements by the host government; quantitative and
qualitative aspects.
Requirement for use of local inputs and parts in manufacturing.
Research and development activities.
Export requirements.
!Iarket power of foreign investors; a demand for reduction in order
to promote local enterprises.
External financing requirement.
Buildini^ up a high-technoloey enterprise.
Reduction of imports.
'n/nership requirement: a reduction of foreign share, and an
increase in local participation.
ir Results
Three issues, namely equity participation, desire to place manage-
-.1 nt control in the hands of local nationals, and transfer pricing
were most often mentioned. Other issues, such is utilization of local
ir.nuts, MNCs
'
interference with the tiost-count ry ' s socio-.t-conomic
norns, etc.. were not considered to be najor problems.
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A similar trend was also observed bv the U.S. State Departnient in
its analysis of conflicts between U.S. business firms and host govern-
ments during the period from 1960 through 1973. The State Department
study indicates that of the 198 cases of conflicts, 128 were concerned
with equity participation. Conflicts on such issues have been on the
rise since 1969.
The >(MCs' Attributes and Conflicts
As outlined in Figure 1, we attempted to examine the relationships
between certain important attributes of the >!NC3 , such as ownership,
oquitv holding in subsidiary, type of industry, nature of technolotjy,
si.'.e, etc., and the nature and intensitv of conflicts between *{?JCs and
host countries. In this section we will briefly summarize the overall
r'^sults of this study. (For details, the reader is requested to refer
to N'egandhi-Baliga, 1979.)
O'wnershlp and Conflict
The U.S. ."!MCs have had more Interface conflicts, while Japanese
'NCs have more operational-level conflicts. However, there were no
.ii-rnif leant differences between the .\merican and European cor-
porations. In fact, the majority of the European MIJCs also faced
nri^rot ional- and policy-level conflicts just like the U.S. MNCs , but
TTiter-.-Ly a fraction of them were plagued with operational problems. In
specific terras, the types of interface problems cxper ienrcd by U.S.
and F.urooean .'KCs centered around the host governments' renuirenents
for dilution of equity and manaijement control, reduction or elimina-
tion of rovalty pa;/ments fi^r technology and '.:now-how, transfer pricing
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policies, etc. The operational problems faced by Japanese "Cs'Cs were:
low morale and employee productivity, hi^h turnover and absenteeism,
and interpersonal conflicts between Japanese expatriate managers and
locals. Such operational problems faced by the Japanese "IMCs have
been recognized for some time by a number of scholars (Kobayashi,
1976).
Fr;n itv and Conflict
One of the most sii^nif leant types of the host country's demands,
especially from the developing countries, is the concern for equity
par t ir ipation by the local nationals in the foreiv^n enterprises. Such
demands by the host countries seem to have resulted in conflicts of the
"M's with the <jovernraents. As sliov>m in Tahl«? •) , who 1 1 v-nwncfi and
•".1 )')r ity-owned corporations tend to have a si:nif icantiy ';reater nro-
'i;rtion of conflict as compared to iCJCs with only a luinority-equi tv
-like. It is emphasized at this stage that minority-participation did
n 31 imoly complete lack, of conflict. Minor itv-owned companies still
hi(i Co contend •..'Ith other policy demands, such as proportionate eraploy-
^ent of nationals, reduction in royalties, etc. This indicates that
T'lL filling one set of the host 'government's demands does not make the
M'.'C immune to further other demands.
r- i-jstrv and Conflict
It is commonly believed that the firms in the resource-based
indu-.tries tend to -^et involved in iii;-:her levels of conflict than tliose
i"' manaf acfiring and service. Our findings 'ive some tnd'.iiations of
thi- -^orc. The extractive industries were involved in a iarvier number
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of interface conflicts than the industries producing nondurable ^oods.
However, the results across the various industries were statistically
insis^nif icant.
Technology and Conflict
Of the 56 cases of conflict observed in technologically advanced
firms, 77% appeared at the interface level. The comparable figures for
intennediate- and low-technology firms were 66% and 53%, respectively.
^his could be attributed to the fact that the advanced firms were ques-
tioned about their leverage through the monopolistic powers, pricing
policies, royalty payments, etc., while the low-technology firms came
unc'.er scrutiny with respect to their usefulness (lack of usefulness)
and contribution to the host countries' developments.
MNCs' Visibility and Degree of Diversification
The degree of visibility of the MMCs affects the views of citizens
and government officials in the host countries positively or negatively,
A firm nay become visible for any one of the following reasons:
1. Extraordinary contributions to the host country;
2. use of specialized technologies;
3. generation of high employment;
i. payment of high wages, and provision of extensive employee
training;
5. high level of conflict with the host-hone >:overnments;
6. international publicity (e.g., ITT episode in Chile; recent
cases of bribes by I'ulf, Lockheed Aircraft, litc);
7. Lone period of operation in the host country; and
>l . pervasiveness of end products in daily life.
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The last factor, of course, reflects both the degree of diversifica-
tion as well as the frequency of use of the end products. Such perva-
siveness achieved through end-product use, is likely co catch the
attention of governmental decision makers and local business competitors,
evoking fears of economic domination. Sinilarly, highly diversified
firms, such as ITT, nay generate the same fears in the host countries.
The diversified MNCs ^'ere confronted with a larger number of nego-
tiational conflicts in the host countries (al:uost twice as many as
chose not diversified). There were less <li f ferenci?s between the most
diversified and the least diversified firms as far as policv-level
conflicts were concerned.
P'^riod of Operation and Conflict
Frequent stories and newspaper headlines about firms suc'n as ^'nited
Fruit in Haiti, ITT in Chile and other Latin .Vmerican countries,
International Petroleum and Cerro de Pasco in Peru, to name a few, lead
.jne to believe that older, well-established firms might have secured
favorable concessions, and, consequently, attained significant bargain-
{^.^ power over host countries. Also, at times, their overt behavior
suggests that they have not hesitated to use their powers against host
i-ountries. Critics have argued that it is the persistence of such
h>'';-,avior on tlie part of the established .'!'i(;s v/hicli causes high levels
of conflict between them and the liost countries (Bergsten, 1976). On
the other hand, the newer firms presumably mav be less prone to conflict
as they have come under recent v'>'>'ernmi'nc i"'''ul at ions
.
Our results show that, nrooorcionally , the oKier firms faced more
interface conflicts, while the newer ones were plagued wich a larger
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number of operational problems. However, Chese differences between the
older and newer firms were not statistically significant.
Size and Conflict
It has been argued that MNCs operate on a theme of "bigger is
better," and that bigness is viewed with hostility by the host govern-
ments. To test such a hypothesis, we explored the relationship between
MNC-size and conflict. MNC-size was operationalized in terms of level
of capital investment, sales volume, size of employee force, .Tnd the
executive's perception of his company's size relative to other
companies—foreign and local, in a given country. Level of investment
and sales volume do not seem to be significantly associated with
level of conflict. The number of employees seems to have some rela-
tionship with the level of conflict; corporations with a larger work
force appeared to have a higher level of conflict. This might be due
to the fact that with a large work force the interests of a larger
constituency have to be borne in mind; and also, with host governments
being sensitive to emploN-ment levels and labor demands, even small
skirmishes with labor easily tend to be escalated into policy— and
-legotlational-level conflicts.
S'. re'-tational Differences and Conflict
Psychologists, political scientists, and other social scientists
concerned with the study of human behavior, have argued for quite some
time that actual or imaginary differences in expectations between two
parties involved in an interaction ar.i likely tu result in a breakdown
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of comaunicacion, and night generate tension and even conflict between
them.
In order to examine whether differences in expectations between
MMCs and host governnents led to a breakdown in cornraunication and
.generated tension and conflict, we drew up a list of a niinber of items
in reisiard to which MNCs and host governments niieht have differing
expectations (see Negandhi-Bali.i^a
, pp. 32-33).
Governnental policies, documents, newspaper reports, and other
iafornation gathered through personal interviews with the ILNCs ' e^'.ecti-
tives and government officials in these countries, provided additional
infornation about their expectations toward each other.
Our results show that a wide ^ap existed between the expectations
of the 'tNCs and the host ^ovei^nments . Such breakdowns in understanding
of "ach other have. Indeed, created continuous tensions and conflicts
in their relationships.
In aore specific terms, many of the developing countries, in order
to .laximize their returns from foreign private investments, have enacted
l'">^ islation which requires a majority local equity in foreign enter-
prises, higher proportion of local nationals in top positions, increase
of exports and foreign exchange earnings, and reduction of imports of
r iw Tiaterial and spare parts.
Such demands by the host countries hav.> , to some extent, constrained
the '!>.'Cs to rationalize their worldwide productive capacitv. In order
to achieve this goal, 'C'.'Cs <)n their part liave rcduireii that host
countries -jrovide then with efficient inf r istructuraL facilities.
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reduce bureaucracic controls and interference in corporate affairs, and
provide favorable labor legislation and more flexible expansion policies
Market Power and Conflict
One of the major concerns of the host nations about MTJCs is that
their local industries are being displaced by foreign-owned companies.
There is also a genuine fear that the !-lNCs could becone nonopolistic
powers, beyond the control of national governments. As Behrman has
observed, "although the host country likes improvement of quality,
reduction of prices, increases of wages, etc., resulting from foreign
i ".ves tr.ent , it -nay not like to see its donestic enterprise pushed to
t:-.e •-all" (1974:44).
Thus, potentially monopolistic or oligopolistic market powers of
t^.e multinationals which could result in a virtual "takeover" of local
•enterprises are actively resisted, not only by the developing, but also
the industrially developed nations. Countries such as Canada, France,
W-est Germany, and the United Kingdom, have enacted regulations to
discourage such behavior on the part of foreign investors. Even the
"nited States, the champion of the free-enterprise system, has shown
concern about the adverse impact of foreign investments on its domestic
entororises (Safarian & Bell, 1975).
'Respite such './idespread concern about the adverse impact of the
r'u 1 ' inat ionals ' market domination in the host countrii.'s, our studv did
not indicate a significant relationship between the TIC' market share
and the nature of conflict in the host ('.ouncries. Altliough a large
proportion of the :";Cs studied indicated that their narket share was
more than iV- , their problems were, in no case, different from those
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faced by conpanies whose aarkeC share was nininal. In oclier words, ic
appeared chat, regardless of aarket share, they were equally susceptible
Co similar issues and problens. .\inong the six countries we studied,
only in Malaysia, and to some extent in Brazil, did the MNCs' market
share have some impact on the type of problems experienced with the
host government. However, the overall relationships between these two
variables was less striking. But this lack of a relationship does not
imnly tliat the developing countries are unconcerned about issues of
economic domination by the :nuicinat ionals . Historical evidence seems
to indicate that the host countries follow a three-phase pattern in
sorting ouC this issue of iLMC-domination. Initially, the host country
nai'.es an assessment of the inpact of forei.ijn direct investment on its
economy. This is i^enerally followed by the imposition of Indus trv-wide
controls of the type India, ilalaysia, Peru, and Brazil have, in the
recent past, imposed on their petroleum, mining, petrochemical, and
pharmaceutical industries. In the final phase, host .'-governments seek
tj attain direct control of the dominating MNCs in a particular industry
throu=;h some form of ownership or managerial control. Some of the
I'ivTnced industrial countries have already entered the final phase men-
tioned above. The U.S., Canada, and U'est (Germany all impose restric-
tions 'n the kinds of industries in which foreign conpanies may invest
(-".ifarian ii Sell, 1975). The ;i.S. government, for example, does not
permit foreign investment in and control of its coastal shipping and
nuclear-related industries. The I.'.S. government also iias not shown
much hesitation in using antitrust Legislation to prevent the formation
of giant monopolies. On the other hand, the ".urooean ..ountries and
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Japan have either directly or iadireccLy supported v^rowch or fomation
of ,<^iant domestic firms in order to combat the influence of the U.S.
MMCs
.
NATURE AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICTS BETIVEEN
MHCs AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
In the industrial countries, governmental decision-riiakers as well
as other public groups (labor unions, consamer advocates, environmen-
talists, and so on) are discovering that national needs, ambitions,
and objectives can be at variance with the ItNCs' objectives, goals,
and strategies.
The range, nature, and intensity of these issues, of course, differ
considerably from country to country, depending upon the prevailina
pi'Iitical climate and economic conditions (unemployment, inflation,
balance of payment position) and the level of industrial and economic
development. For example, in a companion study of lINCs in West Germany
and Belgium, Fry (1977) reported that the issue of worker participation
( "Mi tbestimmung") was the one most prominent in '.Jest Germany, and the
trilitional issues such as providing new tec'nnology, employment up-
- riding of wages, and the developing local resources were considered
s.-cotidary by the government officials.
In contrast, the Belgian Government was more concerned about the
'!'.''.'
5
' impact on employment, balance of pa;/ment position, research and
development activities, and development and utilization of local
resources.
Our results indicate that the labor organizations constitute the
ma^or sources of the JC.'Cs' lieadaches both in industrialized and semi-
industrialized countries. If anything, this trend in labor-management
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relationships is likely Co worsen if the news headlines, such as Che
following, conCinue in Che induscriaiized councries:
• EasCern Air employees were asked Co accepC a one-year's wage
freeze next year (WSJ, Nov. 18, 1981:17).
• American Air will ask ics 36,000 employees Co accepc a 5 percenc
pay-cuC during 1982's firsc quarcer and a wage freeze, possibly
for Che resC of Che year (WSJ, Nov. 18, 1981:1).
• Unemploymenc In the EEC... has climbed Co 9.4 million—a record
8.5 percenc of Che work force (Economise, 1981).
Relacively speaking, such problems are more pronounced in semi-
induscrialized counCrles and Che German companies have Che mosc problems,
while Che Japanese companies face fewer labor problems in Che induscri-
aiized naCions. The laCCer observacion is in conformiCy wich Che
recenc discussions and spoclighcs Che Japanese companies are receiving
concerning their "humanized" approach to employees (Ouchi, 1981). As
indicaCed earlier, in our previous sCudy in developing councries, c he
Japanese companies were noc very successful in miinaging cheir work
force (Negandhi-Baliga) . How long che Japanese companies will be able
Co maincain harmonious employee relacions in induscriaiized councries,
and Co whac exCenC such improved relacions are a function of declining
employment opportunities, is still an open question requiring furcher
research.
The hose governcenc icself was Che second mosC imporcanc source of
problems che multinationals faced in industrialized and semi-
industrialized countries. The specific problems encountered were con-
rerning controls on foreii^n exchange, pricin-.;, prorits, uul expansions.
Approximately Su percent of the multinational companies studied indi-
cated that the government agencies in Che host ccMincries created
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obstacles by enacting restrictive legislations and erecting unnecessary
bureaucratic red tape. This is in line with our previous argument
that higher levels of centralization in decision-making at the MNCs'
headquarters, necessitated by their pursuit of the global rationaliza-
tion process, will create greater tensions in the iLNC-government
relationships. With respect to the consequences of the MNCs'
conflicts, approxinately one-fourth of the companies interviewed indi-
cated that such conflicts have seriously affected their operational
efficiency and demoralized their subsidiaries' managers.
SUMMARY AND IlIPLICATIONS
The paper analyzed the increasing trend toward centralization in
decision-making in multinational companies originating from the U.S.,
Wejt Germany, and Japan. In our earlier study in developing countries,
it was observed that the European and Japanese companies were maintain-
ing more organic-organizational structures. However, this situation
has changed in recent years, particularly with respect to their sub-
sidiaries operating in industrialized countries. Thus, the question
sh.r.uld be asked whether or not the German and Japanese nultinationals
are flexible enough to turn the tide and maintain their organic struc-
tures, as they have been able to do in the developing countries, once
c lie circumstances demand them to do so in the industrialized countries.
Even the Anerican multinationals, champions of evolving progressive
organizational structures for managing expanding international business
(from export department to international division, regional structure,
worldwide product setup, and the matrix system) have been warned about
the swiftly changing environnental conditions in both the developed and
the developing countries.
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De dining or Stagnant Economic Growth
in the Industrialized Countries
On the average, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United
States, and the United Kingdom experienced a drop in the growth of the
GNT from about 3 percent in 1979 to 1 percent in L980. The respective
figures for other countries frou 1979 to 1980 are: Japan, 6.0 to 4.75
percent; West Germany, 3 to 2 percent; Canada, 2.75 to 1.5 percent; and
the United Kingdom, 0.5 to 2 percent. While the growtli rates in aajor
industrialized countries are declining, inflation continues to soar.
Thus, the poorer the future outlook and the higher the inflation rates,
the greater the protectionist forces that may be reinforced in the
United States and other developed countries.
Declining Growth in Productivity
and a Drop in Real Wages
During the last decade, the United States recorded the lowest rate
of productivity growth of any major industrial nation. This Lower
growth rate, coupled with increasing demands by the labor unions for
higher wages, will further increase the tension in labor-management
relations. Under such circumstances, the U.S. Government will be com-
pelled to exercise greater control over wages, prices, and imports,
which in turn may seriously undermine the effectiveness of the global
rationalization policies of the oultinat lunai i-.ompanies.
Given such changing economic and political conditions. Business
International predicts that the multinational corporations will have to
create a responsive organizational structure that will bo able to com-
bine the centralization of strategies and policies with increasing
decentralization of subsidiary-operations.

Whether che German and che Japanese companies, In cheir quest to
adopt the iVmerican model of global rationalization, will be able to
achieve a marriage between centralization of strategies and policies
(as required by the global rationalization concept) and the needed
decentralization or higher autonomy of the subsidiary operation is
still an open question.
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TABLE 3
RELATIVE INFLUENCE OVER 15 DECISION AREAS:
SELECTED STRATEGIC DECISIONS
Item Overall U.S. Japan Germany Sweden U.K.
Appointment of CEO -2.1 -3.0 -1.6 -3.0 - .4 -1.7
Expansion - .8 -1.4 - .2 -1.2 - .5 - .2
:.'ew Products - .2 -1.2 - .8 - .6 .4 .4
Mean -1.3 -1.87 - .33 -1.6 - .17 - .50
Source: Authors' interviews
Nei'.ative score indicates higher influence by the headquarters, while
positive score implies greater autonomy on the part of the overseas
:iubsidiaries.

TABLE 4
CONFLICT VERSUS CONTROLLING OVVNERSHIP OF tlNC
(OVERALL)
U.S. European Japanese
NegoclaClonal
Policy
Operational
Total
17 39.5 13 38.2 5 21.7
16 37.2 15 44.1 4 17.4
10 23.3 6 17.6 14 60.9
43 100 34 100 23 100

TABLE 5
INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF MNCb (SUBSIDIARIES) AfJD THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
Company
actrlbuces
(N-lOO)
Nature of Conflict
negotlatlonal policv
(%) (')
"
rational
slRnlflcance
Equity holding
Wholly ovraed
Majority owned
Minority owned
Karkec share
More than 60Z
26-59:
Less Chan 26Z
Degree of compeclclvantai
Seller's oarlcac
Moderately competitive
Highly competitive
Expectation difference
(between MNCs and
host governments)
Large difference
Moderate difference
Little or no difference
Number of employees
More Chan 1000
999 to 400
399 to 100
Less than 100
Size of InvesCmenC
$4.9-t3 cdllion
52.9-S2 million
S1.9-S.5 million
Less than $500,000
Period of operation
More Chan 15 years
6 Co 14 years
Less Chan 6 years
Degree of dl versif Icstlon
High—more than 5 products
InCeriKdlace— 2 to 5 products
Low— ies6 than 2 products
Level of technology
Advanced technology
Intermediate technology
Low technology
Type of Industry
Extractive Industry
(petroleum & mining)
Cheraical « pharmaceutical
Auto, rubber tires, con-
sumer durables
Consumer nondurables
(soaps, foods)
36 36 28
38 27 35
20 60 20
40 35 25
33 42 25
35 27 38
70 30
46 37 17
25 36 39
54 28 18
27 59 14
21 28 51
40 31 29
40 40 20
19 50 31
17 83
43 31 26
33 42 25
20 40 40
60 40
39 35 26
39 35 26
50 50
43 33 24
24 36 40
24 40 3b
40 37 23
35 31 34
20 33 47
70 20 10
36 29 35
35 38 27
11 50 39
p < .08
p < .4704
p < .05
p < .003
p < .0421
p < .5315
p < .4356
p < .3349
p < .4135
p < .10
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Figure 2
Research and Development Expenditures by the
Subsidiaries
E]Amerfcan (N = 20)
CZ] German (N = 39)
d] Japanese (N = 22)
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